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The rate of inter-industry job turnover in Swedish manufacturing seems to be
driven by the dispersion of profit changes among industries. Shifts in international
competitiveness among industries played a central role for explaining this pattern.
The rate of intra-industry job turnover among plants has been higher in industries
with many small plants, low profit margins and high import penetration.
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1   Background and scope of the paper
A sufficient degree of mobility of factors of production among firms and industries is often
seen as a precondition for maintaining an efficient resource allocation in an economy facing a
changing economic environment. Structural change is reflected in the labor market by
reallocation of jobs among firms and industries, and possibly also by different trends in the
demand for, and rewards to, groups of workers differing with respect to level and type of skill.
In a broad sense, structural change may include not only changes in the industry composition
of output and employment, but also redistribution of employment and market shares among
firms within the same industry, or even changes within firms, e.g concentration to fewer
products or introduction of new technology and products. In this paper, we use the term
structural change in the limited sense of rate of job turnover, i.e. rates of change of the
distribution of employment among industries and plants.
In a closed economy – or in sectors producing non-traded goods and services – the structure
of employment and output will be determined by domestic demand and supply. In general, in a
growing economy one should expect increasing shares of total employment in sectors where
demand is highly elastic with respect to income. A high rate of growth of productivity will
work both ways. On the one hand it will decrease costs and prices and thus increase demand;
on the other, given output, demand for labor will fall.
In the traded goods and services sectors, the structure of employment is determined not only
by the rate of growth of demand – in this case it is world, not domestic, demand that is relevant
– but also by changes in international competitiveness of domestic producers. Employment will
shift towards industries with a high rate of growth of demand where domestic firms are able to
increase their market shares on export markets as well as on the home market.
Moreover, jobs are reallocated among firms within the same industry, in response to firm
specific shifts in demand or technology. The frequency of such demand and supply shocks, as
well as the response to them, may depend on the characteristics of the market – such as the
degree of competition and market power of sellers – and of the production process.3
The scope of this paper is to analyze the determinants of the rate of structural change, defined
as the rate of job turnover, i.e. the rate of change in the distibution of employment, among
industries as well as among plants within the same industry. In particular, the paper will focus
on the role of competition – both national and international - as a driving force behind
structural adjustment. We begin by definining the concepts of structural change and job
turnover, and present models explaining structural change and job turnover in an open
economy.
Since we want to explore the role of international competition for structural change, and since
most markets for services have, until recently, been virtually closed to international trade, the
study is limited to employment in the manufacturing industry. For data reasons, the empirical
analysis is separated into two parts. The first attempts to explain the time pattern of the rate of
inter-industry job turnover in manufacturing. The second part focuses on the variation across
industries with respect to the rate of intra-industry reallocation of employment among plants.
2 Job turnover and structural change
Following Davis et al. (1996) we define job creation and job destruction as changes in
employment on the plant level. On the industry level, job creation in the ith industry is defined
as the sum of employment changes in expanding plants, including entries, whereas job
destruction is the sum of employment changes in contracting (including exits) plants
1:
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j˛+ ￿ denotes summing over plants in the group of expanding plants. Dividing with


















                                               
1 See also Davidsson et al. (1996) and Zetterberg (1997).20
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1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Exit 69 Exit 92 Entry 69 Entry 92
Unlike the rate of inter-industry restructuring of employment, there seems to be no positive
trend in the rate of intra-industry turnover of jobs. Figure 7.1 shows that the rate of within-
industry reallocation was roughly constant up to 1991 but increased slightly in 1992,
coinciding with a strong decline in total employment. This was accounted for partly by a rising23
industries. Such markets are characterized by high rates of product development and process
innovations, and differentiated demand where fashion and brand images are important, thus
making both supply and demand conditions inherently unstable. There are no sufficiently
disaggregated data on innovations or R&D. Further, product differentiation is notoriously
difficult to measure (Caves & Williamson 1985). However, by definition such industries tend
to have high rates of market growth.
The Marshall (1890) rules state that the elasticity of demand for labor of a firm will be higher,
the higher the elasticity of substitution of labor for other factors of production, the higher the
share of wages in total cost, and the more elastic the demand for the firm´s product (Sapsford
& Tzannatos 1993). On the level of aggregation used in this paper, there are data for wage
shares but not for elasticities of factor substitution.
The slope of the marginal revenue curve  () ￿ i F depends on the perceived price elasticity of
demand for the product of the representative firm. When the number of firms is large, this
equals the elasticity of substitution between each pair of products in the industry (Helpman &
Krugman 1985). Thus,  () ￿ i F  is flatter the closer substitutes – i.e. the less differentiated –
products are.
If the number of firms is small, the perceived elasticity of demand will reflect the firm´s
conjectures about the reactions of its competitors to changes in its price and/or sales. In the
case of Cournot competition among identical firms the demand elasticity of the firm will be
proportionate to the number of sellers (Richardson 1989). In general, perceived demand will be
inelastic if firms expect competitors to follow their price changes (Helpman & Krugman 1989).
Awareness of such retaliation should be more likely in highly concentrated industries with few
sellers. A tendency for higher market share stability in concentrated industries was found for
the U.S. by Gort (1963) and Caves & Porter (1978), and for Canada by Baldwin & Gorecki
(1994); see also Schmalensee (1989).
An appropriate measure of market concentration, disregarding imports, could be a Herfindal
index of domestic sales concentration among domestic firms. Lacking such data, one may24
instead use a measure of concentration of domestic production, including exports,
13 or simply
the number of firms or plants in the industry; the latter may underestimate concentration.
This presumes that firms behave in a non-cooperative fashion. Given the patterns of stochastic
shocks, the stability of market shares of firms within an industry may be expected to be higher
in industries where there is some form of collusive behavior. The typical price cartel attempts
to keep prices high by carving up the market among the participants. According to Tirole
(1988) and Jaquemin & Slade (1989), tacit collusion will be simpler to enforce, and thus
should be more frequent, in strongly concentrated industries where firms and products are
relatively homogeneous, where (firm specific) technical progress is slow, and where MC
curves are steeply rising, and MR curves steeply falling.
So far the number of firms have been assumed to be fixed. However, intra-industry job
reallocation is affected also by entry and exit of firms. High barriers to entry are likely to be
found in production with strong economies of scale and high minimum efficient scale (MES),
and therefore with high initial investment requirements which may imply high sunk costs and
thus more  risky projects (Devine et al. 1985, Tirole 1988).
There are no proper measures of MES of plants on the detailed industry classification used
here. Assuming a market outcome where the actual distribution of plant size in an industry will
be concentrated around the MES, we may use average plant size, in terms of output or
employment by plant. A negative relationship between plant size and entry of new firms was
found for Sweden by Hause & Du Reitz (1984).
We will argue here that not only the level but also the change in trade and exposure to foreign
competition in an industry will have a positive effect on the rate of within-industry job
turnover. An increase in the trade ratio of an industry, caused by a parallel increase in  exports
and imports of the ith good, will give increased intra-industry turnover of jobs among plants,
provided that the increase in specialization does not take place within firms and plants. This
might occur in industries consisting of very large and differentiated plants.
                                               
13 Since there are no data on exports by firm and plant, domestic sales by firm and thus concentration cannot be
calculated.30
business cycle fluctuations on job creation and destruction over time.
14 Thus, not only inter-
industry (see section 5) but also intra-industry job turnover seems to follow a counter-cyclical
time pattern.
We expected the level, as well as the increase, of trade to be positively related to the rate of
intra-industry job turnover. The results are somewhat mixed. The level of import penetration
(m) appears to increase the rate of intra-industry job turnover, but the coefficient is significant
only in the weighted regressions. The interpretation may be that a high degree of import
competition reduces firms´ market power and increases the perceived elasticity of demand for
individual products. High import penetration may also increase the volatility of demand shocks.
Increasing import penetration seems to cause more job turnover among plants in an industry.
The coefficient is positive and significant in three of the equations. The negative employment
effects of an increasing import competition in an industry seem to be disproportionately
distributed among firms.
Somewhat unexpectedly it turns out that export orientation (x) seems, if anything, to have a
negative effect on job reallocation, contrary to the hypothesis. This holds also for the increase
in export share. The coefficients are mostly negative, though significant only in one case. Why
market shares in strongly export oriented industries should be more stable than in other sectors
is not easy to explain in a theoretically satisfactory way.
We may, however, offer a tentative explanation based on the market behavior of certain
Swedish export industries. Nordic pulp and paper producers have repeatedly been accused by
the European Commission of forming price cartels, carving up the market for their exports to
the EU. Moreover, expansion of capacity by investment in the forest products industry tends to
be lumpy, in the sense that all the large companies tend to make huge investments at the same
time. This may explain why employment shares are relatively stable at least in some strongly
export oriented industries, and why export market growth seems to benefit all firms to the
same extent.
                                               
14 For those regressions including period dummies  $ L  captures the effects of industry specific cyclical changes
in activity, which need not be perfectly syncronized with the overall business cycle.31
10   Conclusions: competition and job turnover
We found that the rate of inter-industry job turnover in the Swedish manufacturing industry,
which in 1964-96 on average corresponded to 2.7% of the stock of jobs in manufacturing
annually, did show a positive trend over the period. Thus in a historical perspective, the mid-
1970s do not stand out as such an exceptional period of industrial restructuring as was thought
at the time. The time pattern of job reallocation seems to be counter-cyclical.
Actual job turnover is the result of adjustment pressure and resistance. Focusing on the former,
we found the rate of inter-industry job turnover to be driven by the dispersion across industries
in the change of the profit margins; the more profit changes differ, the more turnover,
confirming our model. Our results indicate that shifts among industries in international
competitiveness, which seems to have been increasing over time, did play a central role for the
level, as well as for the trend, of the rate of inter-industry job turnover.
The rate of intra-industry job turnover among plants within industries was much higher; the
annual average in 1986-96 was around 13% of the stock of jobs in the typical industry. More
than half of this was reallocation of jobs among existing plants, while entry and exit of plants
contributed about one fifth each. Unlike the reallocation among industries it displays no trend.
Since the early 1990s, within-industry job turnover has been falling; this is also true for its
components, i.e. reallocation among existing plants and turnover due to entry and exit.
The results of the econometric analysis indicate that the rate of intra-industry job turnover
among plants tends to be high in industries consisting of many small plants, with low gross
profit margins (mark-ups) and where domestic firms are exposed to import competition. Our
interpretation is that this reflects the limited market power of firms in such industries, which
means that market shares and the distribution of employment will be highly sensitive to firm


































































































































































































 Standardized residuals from the estimation results of column IV of Table 5.1
 According to Figure A3.1 models II and IV imply autocorrelation among the residuals, which is in full
accordance with the Durbin-Watson and the Breusch-Godfrey statistics regarding model II. However,
these two tests give different indications for the estimation results of column IV. The Durbin-Watson
statistic falls into the inconclusive region while the Breusch-Godfrey statistic implies that there is no
significant sign of autocorrelation among the residuals. This inconsistency could be a sign of
misspecification of the model.
 
 We also add the first lag of the dependent variable to pick up some of the autocorrelation. This
improves the Durbin-Watson statistic but leaves all other indpendent variables insignificant. Moreover,
models II and IV contain significant lags of order six, which may be due to business cycle variation that
we have not been able to fully control for.
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CUSUM of Squares 5% Significance
A4  Intra-industry job turnover: the data
Data for employment by plant and industry in Swedish manufacturing have been obtained from the data
base ÅRSYS, compiled by Statistics Sweden. Plants are classified by 5-digit industry for 1986-93
according to the SNI69 (identical to ISIC to the 4-digit level) and for 1990-96 according to SNI92,
which is based on NACE). Since it has not been possible to translate one classification into the other,
we work with two different but partly overlapping data panels, one for 1986-93 (panel 1), the other for
1990-96 (panel 2). The calculations described below are performed on both panels.
For each industry and year we calculate the share of employment for each plant in that industry and then
the change in employment share from one year to the next according to (2.6). A plant with data for
employment up to and including year t , which is missing from year t+1 and after, is treated as an exit
from t to t+1. A plant with positive employment from t+1, but where previous data are missing, is
classified as an entry.
For our data to be economically relevant it is necessary that behind each appearance or dissappearance
of a plant identity (code number) there is a ”real” change in the sense that a certain economic activity is
started or closed down. A plant code number may change if the plant changes both owner and activity
classification (SNI code) or address; the plant identity is thus more stable than that of the firm. For
changes pertaining to larger firms there is a manual control. For small plants, however, our data for
entry and exit frequencies may be somewhat overstated, to the extent that identity code numbers appear
or disappear without any “real” changes taking place.
Another complication is that existing plants may change SNI code. In principle plants are assigned to
industries on the basis of its (main) product(s) according to the product-industry concordance. Thus, a
multi-product plant may be re-classified following a change of its product mix. One could then argue
that this might be treated as a combination of an exit (in the old industry) and an entry (in the new).
However, according to Statistics Sweden, most re-classifications occur because previous classifications
are corrected. When calculating changes between two years we have therefore chosen to neglect changes
of SNI code. The employment change of such a plant is thus classified as a change of the share of an
existing plant in the “old” industry.
Changes in rules for taxation registration resulted in apparent changes in the number of plants registered
in the ÅRSYS data base in 1991 and 1994. However, these changes seem to have been mostly affecting
very small (one person) firms in agriculture and services (Davidsson et al. 1996). To sum up,
measurement errors in the material tend to exaggerate intra-industry job mobility among plants, in
particular entry and exit. It is difficult to estimate the order of magnitude of these errors. However, they43
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